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In Scott v. Savers Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,' the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that government immunity2 protected a Wisconsin
school district from liability for the negligence of its guidance counselor
who had provided a student with incorrect information regarding the
eligibility requirements for a student-athlete scholarship.' The guidance
counselor's negligence resulted in the student losing a hockey
scholarship he had received from the University of Alaska.
While the court held that government immunity protected the school
district from liability, the court characterized the outcome of the case as
"harsh" because of the clear negligence of the guidance counselor.
5
Moreover, the concurring and dissenting opinions revealed that a
majority of the justices had reservations about Wisconsin's current
government immunity doctrine.6  In fact, Justice Bablitch, in a
concurrence joined by Justice Crooks, showed more than mere
reservations about the present state of government immunity in
Wisconsin when he called the protection provided by such immunity
"unjust"7 and predicted that "[a] doctrine of governmental immunity
that has caused such injustice and inequity, in this case and others,
cannot, and.., will not, stand much longer., 8 Justice Prosser, in his
dissenting opinion, also characterized Wisconsin's government
immunity doctrine as "unjust" and declared the doctrine "contrary to
1. 2003 WI 60, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715.
2. In Wisconsin, the concept of government immunity is "sometimes referred to as
,municipal' or 'governmental' immunity, or 'public officer' immunity, or even 'discretionary
act' immunity." Hoskins v. Dodge County, 2002 WI App 40, 13, 251 Wis. 2d 276, 642
N.W.2d 213.
3. Scott, 2003 WI 60, 8-10.
4. Id. [ 8-10.
5. Id. $[ 37.
6. Id. 58-59 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); id. 61-63 (Bablitch, J., concurring);
id. [ 75-82 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
7. Id. 62 (Bablitch, J., concurring).
8. Id.
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legislative intent."9  The majority opinion, however, recognized that
government immunity "plays a significant role in our legal system" and
was reluctant to remove the protection it provided."
Government immunity does serve an important role in our legal
system." However, as evidenced by the unjust outcome of the Scott
case, Wisconsin's government immunity doctrine is in need of revision. 2
The analysis used in determining whether government immunity will
shield negligent conduct from liability needs to be reexamined. First,
the analysis needs to focus on the particular act at issue and not on the
general duties of the public official. 3 Second, the analysis needs to
ensure that government immunity protects government action only
when it serves an important public policy and not merely because the act
is discretionary, rather than ministerial, in nature. 4
Part II of this Comment briefly defines government immunity, and
Part III provides some historical background. Part IV discusses some of
the policy objectives that have been cited in support of government
immunity and some of the arguments for limiting the application of
government immunity. The conclusion of Part IV is that the only policy
objectives that adequately justify applying government immunity are
those that concern the separation of powers. Part V discusses the
discretionary/ministerial test that courts, including the Wisconsin courts,
have used to determine whether government immunity will apply. Part
V then suggests that to ensure that government immunity is only applied
when public policy warrants shielding the government from liability, the
courts should consider (1) whether the particular government act at
issue is discretionary in nature, (2) whether the act involves a policy
9. Id. 82 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
10. Id. $ 35-37.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Some of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices seemed willing to revise the
government immunity doctrine. See Scott, 2003 WI 60, 7 58-60 (Abrahamson, C.J.,
concurring); id. 61-64 (Bablitch, J., concurring); id. 75-82 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Abrahamson, in her concurrence joined by Justices Bablitch and Crooks,
suggested that if the court was ready to revisit Wisconsin's government immunity doctrine,
the court "should set [the Scott] case for rebriefing and re-argument.., and invite amicus
curiae participation from affected actors." Id. IT 58-59 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). The
court later denied the motion for reconsideration of the Scott case. Scott v. Savers Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 140, 266 Wis. 2d 68, 671 N.W.2d 853.
13. Rolland v. County of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 53, 8, 241 Wis. 2d 215, 625 N.W.2d
590 ("'[I]t is the nature of the specific act upon which liability is based, as opposed to the
categorization of the general duties of a public officer, which is determinative of whether an
officer is immune from liability."' (internal citation omitted)).
14. See infra Parts IV-V.
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decision, and (3) whether the court system provides an adequate
framework for monitoring or disciplining the government action. Part
VI discusses Wisconsin's government immunity doctrine, and Part VII
explains why applying government immunity in the Scott case was
problematic.
II. GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY: A BRIEF DEFINITION
"An immunity is a freedom from suit or liability" 15 and is based on
the idea that even "though the defendant might be a wrongdoer, social
values of great importance require[] that the defendant escape
liability."16  Thus, government immunity permits government entities
and public officials to avoid suits or liability17 when it is adequately
justified by public policy."i Traditional government immunity refers to
immunity attaching to all levels of government.19 However, in some
jurisdictions, government immunity refers to the immunity of the state's
political subdivisions and sovereign immunity refers to the immunity of
the state.2°
III. GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY: A BRIEF HISTORY
The American concept of government immunity is said to have
derived from the English common law notion that the king could do no
15. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at
1032 (5th ed. 1984).
16. Id.
17. Scott, 2003 WI 60, $ 14-16; KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, at § 131, at 1032-33; 57
AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 1, 10, at 40-41, 51 (2001).
18. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1032 (stating that "social values of great
importance" may permit a defendant to avoid liability and noting that these social values are
"apt to be grounded in values and perceptions of the times"); see also Hillerby v. Town of
Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 449 (Vt. 1997) (Dooley, J., dissenting) ("Our task should be to
tailor our law on municipal immunity to the modern policy reasons for recognizing such
immunity."); Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 89-90, 596 N.W.2d 417,
421-22 (1999) (noting that "governmental immunity is founded upon policy considerations").
For some of the policy considerations cited in support of government immunity, see infra
Part IV.
19. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033 ("The traditional governmental
immunity protects governments at all levels from legal actions."); Jamie McAlister, The New
Mexico Tort Claims Act: The King Can Do "Little" Wrong, 21 N.M. L. REV. 441, 441 (1991)
("Traditional governmental immunity exempts all levels of government from legal suits
against the government and its entities.").
20. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 10, at 51
(2001). In Wisconsin, the concept of government immunity is distinct from the concept of
sovereign immunity. Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 89-90, 596 N.W.2d at 421-22; see also infra Part
VI and note 99.
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wrong." This notion that the king could do no wrong was articulated in
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, which stated that
"[t]he king... is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking
wrong., 22 Eventually, because most states adopted the English common
law,23 the concept of government immunity found a place in American
law as well.
24
While America's adoption of the English common law was not
unusual,' America's acceptance of the doctrine of government
immunity is surprising.26 It seems odd that this nation would accept a
doctrine based on the notion that the king could do no wrong when the
founders of this nation clearly felt that the king indeed could do wrong.27
21. Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 386, 51 N.W.2d 30, 32 (1952); Gerald P.
Krause, Comment, Municipal Liability: The Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection -
The Special Duty Doctrine Should be Discarded, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 499, 500 (1984); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033; but see 1 J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN
TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 16.01, at 554 (rev. ed. 1994) (noting that Bracton's
writings regarding "the supremacy of the law over kings," which became "established English
doctrine," meant that "the king was not permitted by law to do wrong. It did not mean that
the king could do no wrong if left to his own devices"); 2 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F.
KRAUSE, & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 8, n.5 (2003) (discussing
three theories regarding the origin of government immunity as applied to municipalities and
other local units of government).
22. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 187 (Wayne
Morrison ed., Cavendish Publishing Limited 2001); LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, § 16.01,
at 553.
23. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, § 16.01, at 553 ("Most of the American states
adopted English common law as it existed up to the date of the Declaration of
Independence."); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 10, at 574 (2001) (noting that the
"English common law has been adopted as the basis of jurisprudence in all the states ... with
the exception of Louisiana, where the civil law prevails in civil matters").
24. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033; LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, §§
16.01, 16.09, at 553-55, 573-74; Mark R. Brown, Deterring Bully Government A Sovereign
Dilemma, 76 TUL. L. REV. 149, 149 (2001); McAlister, supra note 19 at 442 and nn.13-14;
Krause, supra note 21, at 500-02.
25. See supra note 23.
26. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 30-31, 115 N.W.2d 618, 620 (1962) ("It
would seem somewhat anomalous that American courts should have adopted the sovereign
immunity theory in the first place since it was based upon the divine right of kings."),
superseded by statute as stated in Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, 9 34, 262
Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715; LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, § 16.01, at 553-55; Brown,
supra note 24, at 149-50; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033; McAlister,
supra note 19, at n.13.
27. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Graysneck v. Heard,
220 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) ("Our very nation is founded on the
proposition that a king can be wrong, very wrong. Thomas Jefferson wrote a strong
indictment against King George III, it will be recalled."); LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, §
16.01, at 554.
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After all, the Declaration of Independence listed "a long train of abuses
and usurpations" by the king.28 Moreover, as evidenced by the
constitutional provision for impeachment, the founders acknowledged
that the president, vice president, and civil officers of their new
government were capable of wrongdoing.29 Thus, although the doctrine
of government immunity was present in early American cases,3" the
acceptance of the doctrine into American law is surprising when one
understands the doctrine's history.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY'S PLACE IN
AMERICAN LAW
Regardless of how or why, the doctrine of government immunity
became embedded in American law. The question is whether
government immunity should still have a place in American law. After
all, such immunity exempts government from liability for its tortious
conduct31 and contradicts the basic tort principle that liability should
follow negligence.32 Moreover, exempting a wrongdoer from liability
solely because the wrongdoer is a government entity or a public official
seems counterintuitive to one's basic sense of justice.33  Thus, as a
general rule, government should be subject to the same rules as private
parties for tortious conduct 34 and should be exempt from liability for
28. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also LEE &
LINDAHL, supra note 21, § 16.01, at 554.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see also LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, § 16.01, at 554.
30. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033 and n.8; McAlister, supra note 19 at
442 and nn.13-14; Krause, supra note 21, at 500-02.
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1032-33; Krause, supra note 21, at 500; 57
AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 1, 3, at 40-42, (2001); see,
e.g., Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715.
32. Merrill v. City of Manchester, 332 A.2d 378, 383 (N.H. 1974); Hillerby v. Town of
Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 453 (Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Krause, supra note 21, at
503; see also Battalla v. New York, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. 1961) ("[A] wrong-doer is
responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of his misconduct ....") (internal
citations omitted); KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 30, at 164-65 (noting that liability will
follow negligence if the elements of duty, breach, cause, and harm are established).
33. See Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1279 (Pa. 1986)
(Larsen, J., dissenting); J. Michael Riley, Discretionary Immunity: The Exception That
Swallowed the Rule, 19 THE VERDICT, Summer 1996, at 10, 15.
34. City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (stating that
government officials should be "held to the same safety standards as other citizens"); Merrill,
332 A.2d at 383 (stating that "removal of immunity does not impose absolute or strict liability
on cities and towns but merely places them subject to the same rules as private corporations if
a duty has been violated and a tort committed"); Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 458 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that government should be placed "on an equal footing with private
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tortious conduct only when "social values of great importance"
adequately justify applying government immunity."
A. Maintaining the Separation of Powers
One justification for government immunity is that the doctrine helps
to maintain the separation of powers, an important feature of our
governmental system.36 The argument is that to have separate and co-
equal branches of government, public officials must be able to use "free
and independent judgment" when making policy decisions 37-those
decisions that require the "weighing of competing social, economic, and
political policy considerations."38  Government immunity is necessary
corporate entities" for tortious conduct unless the government action is "policy-based
or... adjudicative, legislative, or regulatory in nature"). Congress, in enacting the Federal
Tort Claims Act, provided that the national government would be liable with regard to tort
claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2004).
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1032.
36. Indus. Indem. Co. v. Alaska, 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983) ("The principal policy
underlying the tort immunity is to limit judicial reexamination of decisions properly entrusted
to other branches of government."); Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Monroe County, 528
N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. 1988) ("The policy underlying governmental immunity is the fundamental
idea that certain kinds of executive branch decisions should not be subject to judicial review.
The separation of powers doctrine forecloses the courts from reviewing political, social and
economic actions within the province of coordinate branches of government."); Hillerby, 706
A.2d at 457 (Johnson, J. dissenting) ("To preserve separate and coequal branches of
government that best serve the public's interests, government officials must feel that they can
use free and independent judgment, without the threat of liability hanging over them,
regarding decisions involving the balancing of priorities or the allocation of resources.");
KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033 (noting that "judicial review of executive action
in tort suits or otherwise presents some degree of threat to the independence of the executive
and the separation of powers"); Krause, supra note 21, at 502 (noting that one policy
rationale for government immunity is that government immunity ensures that the judiciary
does not "indiscriminately impose its authority on other branches of government"); see also
Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, 35-36 & n.26, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663
N.W.2d 715 (noting that government immunity enables public officials to perform their duties
without being influenced by the threat of a lawsuit and that the misconduct of public officials
should be addressed through the political, rather than judicial, process).
37. Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 457 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("To preserve separate and
coequal branches of government that best serve the public's interests, government officials
must feel that they can use free and independent judgment, without the threat of liability
hanging over them, regarding decisions involving the balancing of priorities or the allocation
of resources."); see also Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. 1990); Scott,
2003 WI 60, 36.
38. Indus. Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 200, 204 (E.D. La.
1990); see also Kautzman v. McDonald, 621 N.W.2d 871, 879-80 (N.D. 2001) (noting that
"public policy considerations, social, economic, or political, must be distinguished from more
objective standards based on, for example, scientific, engineering, or technical
considerations" (internal citations omitted)); John W. Bagby & Gary L. Gittings, The Elusive
2005] GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
then because the threat of liability for policy decisions might interfere
with the free and independent judgment of public officials,39 and public
officials should be protected from undue judicial influence. 4
In addition to ensuring the free and independent judgment of public
officials, another justification for applying government immunity to
policy decisions of public officials is that a court may not be the
appropriate forum for monitoring policy decisions where the real issues
are not due care or reasonableness, but "social wisdom," "political
practicability," and "economic expediency.,41 Unless objective
professional standards could be applied to the challenged act and tort
liability could offer a reliable method of assessment,42 the political
process may be the more appropriate method for monitoring or
disciplining policy decisions. 3
B. Protecting the Public Purse
Another policy cited in support of government immunity is that the
doctrine protects the public purse." The argument is that public funds
Discretionary Function Exception From Government Tort Liability: The Narrowing Scope of
Federal Liability, 30 AM. Bus. L. J. 223, 253 (1992) ("Policy decisions are grounded in social,
economic, and political considerations involving issues of social wisdom, political
practicability, and economic expediency." (internal citations omitted)).
39. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 44; Haddock, 553 N.E.2d at 991; Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 457
(Johnson, J., dissenting); Scott, 2003 WI 60, 36; KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at
1033; Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 247; Krause, supra note 21, at 502.
40. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 44; KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033; Bagby &
Gittings, supra note 38, at 247; Krause, supra note 21, at 502.
41. Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D. Pa 1978); see also Indus.
Indem. Co. v. Alaska, 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983) ("The judicial branch lacks the fact-
finding ability of the legislature, and the special expertise of the executive departments....
[T]he courts.., should not attempt to balance the detailed and competing elements of
legislative or executive decisions."); Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 44-45; Bowers v. City of
Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tenn. 1992); Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 247.
42. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 47 (noting that if a decision is not a policy decision but is
instead based on professional judgment, then "traditional tort standards for professional
negligence afford a basis for evaluation"); Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 257-58 (noting
that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, where "the standards to be applied involve objective
and known criteria or require only the exercise of scientific or professional judgments that are
reviewable under tort law, the government is not shielded from liability").
43. See Scott, 2003 WI 60, 35 & n.26 (noting that one policy rationale underlying the
doctrine of government immunity is that the misconduct of political officials should be
addressed through the political, rather than judicial, process); Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co.,
2002 WI 71, 23, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314 (noting that government immunity is
based in part on a "preference for political rather than judicial redress for the actions of
public officers").
44. See, e.g., Vargas v. Glades Gen. Hosp., 566 So. 2d 282, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Scott, 2003 WI 60, 35; Lodl, 2002 WI 71, T 23; see also Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis.
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should be used for public purposes rather than for satisfying liability
judgments45 and that individual plaintiffs should not be "compensated at
the expense of the general public. '4 6 However, if the public does not
bear the cost, the victim of the government's tortious conduct is left with
"no avenue for redress '4 7 and is forced to "bear the burden of loss alone
without recompense from the wrongdoer.""4R Such a result neither
complies with the modern tort principle that liability follows negligence ' 9
nor with the idea that the victim of tortious conduct is entitled to a
remedy.'o Thus, when a government entity or a public official is
negligent, the government should be liable, even if that means that the
general public must bear the cost. 1 The liability should be regarded as
"a cost of the administration of government., ' 2 After all, such liability
or cost would not have arisen if the public official had not acted in a
2d 356, 372, 293 N.W.2d 504, 512 (1980); Brown, supra note 24 at 152; McAlister, supra note
19, at 442; Krause, supra note 21, at 502-03.
45. Merrill v. City of Manchester, 332 A.2d 378, 380 (N.H. 1974) (noting that one of the
reasons for government immunity that evolved was that "cities and towns could not carry on
their functions if moneys raised by taxation for public use were diverted to making good for
torts of employees"); McAlister, supra note 19, at 442 (noting that New Mexico's judicial
acceptance of government immunity was, in large part, based on a reluctance to use public
funds "for the satisfaction of liability judgments instead of for the public purpose for which
they were appropriated") (internal citations omitted); Krause, supra note 21, at 502 (noting
that one policy rationale cited in support of government immunity is that without such
immunity governments would have to "use funds allocated to other essential functions" to
satisfy adverse judgments).
46. Krause, supra note 21, at 502.
47. Scott, 2003 WI 60, 1 37.
48. McAlister, supra note 19, at 442; see also Merrill, 332 A.2d at 380 ("That an
individual injured by the negligence of the employees of a municipal corporation should bear
his loss himself.., instead of having it borne by the public treasury to which he and all other
citizens contribute, offends the basic principles of equality of burdens and of elementary
justice."); Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt., Inc. v. City of Winooski Hous. Auth., 408 A.2d
649, 650 (Vt. 1979) (noting that the effect of government immunity is to "sacrifice the injured
citizen to the benefit of the public treasury").
49. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 380-81, 383; Hillerby v. Town of Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 453
(Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Krause, supra note 21, at 503; see also supra note 32.
50. Tort law is "directed toward the compensation of individuals.., for losses which
they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized interests." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 1, at 5-6.
51. Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 454 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting that "most jurisdictions
abrogated general municipal immunity between the late 1950s and the early 1980s,
recognizing that the community at large rather than the individual should bear the risk of
injury resulting from the negligent conduct of government employees"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C cmt. d (2003); Krause, supra note 21, at 503.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C cmt. d (2003); Krause, supra note 21, at
503; see also Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1278 (Pa. 1986)
(Larsen, J., dissenting).
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tortious manner in the performance of his or her duties. Moreover, any
increased costs will be "overcome by the added societal benefits of more
effective and efficient government"53 because compensating the victim
of tortious conduct not only provides that victim with a remedy but also
deters future government wrongdoing.-4 Furthermore, the government
can prepare for the cost of liability judgments by obtaining liability
insurance.55
C. Ensuring the Orderly Administration of Government
Proponents of government immunity have also argued that the
doctrine helps to ensure the "orderly administration of government.
5 6
Subjecting the government to liability does have the potential to create
an administrative burden because government action can affect large
53. Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 261.
54. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 383; Feingold, 517 A.2d at 1278 (Larsen, J., dissenting); Bagby &
Gittings, supra note 38, at 261-62.
[C]ritics might note that governments and their employees seldom bear directly the
negative wealth effects of their negligence. Instead, the pubic bears these losses
through higher taxes, diminished government services, and other reductions in social
welfare. However, the public is growing less tolerant of these outcomes. As voters
gain a heightened awareness of the governmental budgeting process, and exert
greater populist pressure to justify government programs, governmental budget
balancing will be required because voters are resisting tax hikes. In this
environment, the political process pressures government officials to... better
monitor their subordinates' activities.... While government employees seldom
suffer personal financial loss for the effect of their decisions,... a similar level of
ambiguity and insulation is experienced by employees in large private businesses.
Therefore, the expansion of government liability to activities for which the private
sector is traditionally responsible actually brings the incentives of both government
and private activity closer together, arguably improving government's responsibility.
Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 262. However, some proponents of government
immunity argue that exposure to tort liability may not encourage government officials to use
due care in the performance of their duties, but rather cause government officials "to forego
their public duties ... to minimize government's exposure to damages." Brown, supra note
24, at 153.
55. City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) ("Private
citizens voluntarily and for good economic reasons insure themselves against tort liability.
Why shouldn't a collection of citizens classified as a municipality do likewise?"); Merrill, 332
A.2d at 383 ("Liability insurance which protects other corporations, be they private business
or charitable institutions, can provide the same safeguards for municipal corporations."); see
also Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So. 2d 1234, 1238 (Miss. 1999); Morway v.
Trombly, 789 A.2d 965, 969 (Vt. 2001).
56. G.M. McCrossin, Inc. v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 355 S.E.2d 32, 34 (W. Va. 1987); see
also Vargas v. Glades Gen. Hosp., 566 So. 2d 283,284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [88:971
numbers of people in a variety of ways. 7 However, there is little
support for the contention that, without the doctrine of government
immunity, the courts would be inundated with litigation or that there
would be a significant impact on the administration of government.'
Moreover, although "permitting actions against public entities entails
some imposition of their time,"59 the basic tort principle that liability
should follow negligence still applies." Thus, any increased
administrative burden is a cost that must be endured to ensure that
victims of government's tortious conduct are compensated. 6' The
government can reduce the administrative burden by using due care in
the performance of its duties and by reducing the amount of tortious
conduct, which serves as the basis for such lawsuits. Expecting public
officials to use care in the performance of their duties is not too much to
ask in that it puts government on the same footing as private parties.62
D. Preventing Individuals from Being
Discouraged to Enter Public Service
Another argument cited in support of government immunity is that
without it, individuals may be discouraged from entering into public
service because they would face the threat of liability for performing
their duties.63 However, because removing government immunity simply
57. Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 372, 293 N.W.2d 504, 514 (1980)
("Government engages in activities of a scope and variety far beyond that of any private
business, and governmental operations affect a large number of people."); 57 AM. JUR. 2D
Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 2, at 41-42 (2001).
58. See Bd. of Comm'rs of the Port of New Orleans, 273 So. 2d at 25 ("It is clear that
fears of those who believed the doctrine [of government immunity] necessary to existence of
government were unfounded. No agency that we know of has been bankrupted by the torts
of its employees nor submerged in litigation."); Merrill, 332 A.2d at 383 (citing Ayala v. Phila.
Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 882 (Pa. 1973)) ("'[T]he empirical data does not support the
fear that governmental functions would be curtailed as a result of liability for tortious
conduct."'); Riley, supra note 33, at 14 (noting that "permitting actions against public entities
entails some imposition on their time" but also noting that "[t]here has... been no showing
this would involve a significant burden or would disrupt government operation in any
meaningful way").
59. Riley, supra note 33, at 14.
60. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 380-81, 383; Hillerby v. Town of Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 453
(Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Krause, supra note 21, at 503; see also supra note 32.
61. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 380; Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt., Inc. v. City of Winooski
Hous. Auth., 408 A.2d 649, 650 (Vt. 1979); see supra note 50.
62. City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Merrill, 332
A.2d at 383; Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 458 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see supra note 34.
63. Stephenson v. State Dep't of Transp., 619 P.2d 247, 250 (Or. 1980) (noting that one
rationale for immunity is that "without immunity, highly skilled employees would not accept
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puts public officials on equal footing with private parties,64 the threat of
liability for tortious conduct should not discourage individuals from
entering public service any more than the threat of liability for tortious
conduct would. discourage individuals from taking a position with a
private entity.
In conclusion, while many arguments are offered in support of
government immunity, the only policy that adequately justifies leaving
an injured victim without redress for the government's tortious conduct
is the doctrine of separation of powers.65 Because government immunity
serves a valuable role in maintaining the separation of powers, public
policy justifies applying immunity where the challenged government
action is of a policymaking character-involving social, economic, or
political judgments-and where the government action is best
monitored through the political process rather than through tort
actions.6' Although government immunity does have a place in
American law, it is important to be mindful of the consequences of
applying government immunity in a given case. Unfortunately, where
government immunity is applied, the injured victim will be left without a
remedy.67 Thus, the application of government immunity must be
limited to only those circumstances where tort liability would implicate
separation of powers concerns. 68  A blanket rule of government
immunity is not necessary; rather, the government should be placed on
equal footing with private parties when the government action is not of
a policymaking character 69 and when the government action can be
public positions because the potential liability was not commensurate with the relatively low
compensation that public bodies pay"); Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60,
n.26, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 (stating that one policy consideration supporting
government immunity is that, without government immunity, "the threat of personal liability"
might deter people from "entering public service"); but see Riley, supra note 33, at 14
("Government entities almost uniformly carry insurance, and public employees are generally
entitled to indemnification as a matter of law. Given these realities, it is difficult to credit
anyone will be deterred from public service or unfairly subjected to personal liability for the
acts taken in their official capacities.").
64. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 383 (stating that "removal of immunity does not impose absolute
or strict liability on cities and towns but merely places them subject to the same rules as
private corporations if a duty has been violated and a tort committed").
65. See supra Part IV.A. and notes 36-43.
66. See supra Part IV.A. and notes 36-43.
67. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt., Inc. v. City of Winooski Hous. Auth., 408 A.2d 649,
650 (Vt. 1979) (noting that the effect of government immunity is to "sacrifice the injured
citizen"); see, e.g., Scott, 2003 WI 60, 37 (stating that the plaintiff "has suffered greatly" and
has "no avenue for redress").
68. See Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind. 1988).
69. See id. at 46 (noting that the "governmental entity seeking to establish immunity
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adequately assessed through a tort action.70
V. DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY
Various tests have been developed to limit the application of the
doctrine of government immunity.7' One such test is the
discretionary/ministerial test, which typically shields government from
liability in tort for discretionary acts while permitting liability for
ministerial acts.72 As a general rule, an act is deemed to be discretionary
when the act involves "judgment and choice, 73 and can "typically
produce different acceptable results., 71 Ministerial acts, on the other
hand, have been defined as acts that leave no room for judgment 7 and
stem from a duty that is "absolute, certain and imperative."76 Thus,
where a rule exists regarding how the public official should act, the act is
generally ministerial and not discretionary.'
Policy decisions are typically discretionary in nature because policy
decisions involve the "weighing of competing social, economic, and
bears the burden of proving that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by
consciously balancing risks and benefits"); Hacking v. Town of Belmont, 736 A.2d 1229,
1232-34 (N.H. 1999) (stating that an exception to the general rule of liability is immunity for
executive or planning functions involving policy decisions); Hillerby v. Town of Colchester,
706 A.2d 446, 458 (Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting that government should be
placed "on an equal footing with private corporate entities" for tortious conduct unless the
government action is "policy-based or... adjudicative, legislative, or regulatory in nature");
see also Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529,
1532 (1992) (discussing the federal doctrine of sovereign immunity and noting that "the less
that a particular action jeopardizes purposeful policy, the less the concern from the
separation-of-powers vantage point").
70. See Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 44-47.
71. For example, one test courts have used to limit the application of government
immunity is the discretionary/ministerial test. This test typically provides immunity for
discretionary functions and exposes government to liability for ministerial functions. See, e.g.,
Scott, 2003 WI 60. Another test courts have used distinguishes between governmental
functions and proprietary functions; the government is protected from liability when the
government is acting in a governmental capacity or acting in the interest of the public, and the
government is exposed to liability when it acts in a corporate or proprietary capacity. See,
e.g., Hillerby, 706 A.2d 447. For further discussion regarding tests courts have used in
determining the applicability of government immunity, see LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, §
16.09, at 574-79.
72. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, § 16.09, at 575; see, e.g., Scott, 2003 WI 60.
73. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 43.
74. Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. 1990).
75. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 43; Scott, 2003 WI 60, 27.
76. Scott, 2003 WI 60, 27,
77. See Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 43.
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political policy considerations"" and the public official is not directed to
act in a specific way but must use his or her judgment. 9 Because
policymaking decisions are discretionary in nature, courts have
attempted to maintain the separation of powers and protect
policymaking decisions by applying government immunity to
discretionary acts.8° The problem with applying immunity to all of
government's discretionary acts, however, is that almost all government
action is then protected, not just acts that truly involve policymaking.8 1
This is because almost every decision involves some amount of
discretion.82 In fact, "it would be difficult to conceive of any official act,
no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion
in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of
a nail." 3
Recognizing that immunity should not be applied to all government
action but rather limited to only those acts necessary to maintain the
separation of powers,8' some jurisdictions require that to be deemed
discretionary, the government act must involve more than just
judgment-the act must also involve policymaking. For example, the
decisions of referees and coaches are decisions that do not involve
policymaking, and, therefore, even though those decisions may involve
some discretion and judgment, they would not be characterized as
discretionary decisions entitled to be protected by government
immunity. Essentially, while the discretionary nature of the act at issue
can be a useful starting point in determining whether government
immunity should apply,87 the inquiry cannot end there because nearly all
78. Indus. Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 200, 204 (E.D. La.
1990).
79. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 43.
80. Japan Air Lines Co. v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska 1981); Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at
44; LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 21, § 16.09, at 575; Krause, supra note 21, at 506-07.
81. See Indus. Risk Inurers, 735 F. Supp. at 202-03; Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 43; Hacking v.
Town of Belmont, 736 A.2d 1229, 1232-34 (N.H. 1999); Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 986
P.2d 752, 758-59 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38 at 228.
82. Indus. Risk Insurers, 735 F. Supp. at 203; Ham v. Los Angeles County, 189 P. 462,
468 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 43; Hacking, 736 A.2d at 1234; Trujillo,
986 P.2d at 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38 at 228.
83. Ham, 189 P. at 468.
84. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 43-46; Trujillo, 986 P.2d at 758-59.
85. See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers, 735 F. Supp. at 202-03; Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 46;
Hacking, 736 A.2d at 1234; Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. 1990);
Trujillo, 986 P.2d at 758-59.
86. Hacking, 736 A.2d at 1234.
87. See, e.g., Kautzman v. McDonald, 621 N.W.2d 871, 879-80 (N.D. 2001) (stating that
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decisions involve at least some small amount of discretion 8 and
immunity should not be used to protect all government decisions, but
rather only those that involve policy decisions.89
Thus, in addition to considering whether the government act
involves a policy decision, courts need to consider whether the act
involves a policy decision that needs to be protected from judicial
review to maintain separate and co-equal branches of government. 90 In
other words, the courts need to consider whether the decisionmaker's
actions should be assessed through the tort system. After all, policy
decisions involving social, political, and economic judgments91 are best
made by the public officials faced with the decision and, as a general
rule, should not be second-guessed by courts.' However, if objective
professional standards could be applied to the challenged act, tort
liability may be appropriate because it would offer a reliable way to
monitor the government action 9 and would provide a remedy to the
whether a political subdivision is exempt from liability begins by determining whether the act
at issue is discretionary).
88. Indus. Risk Insurers, 735 F. Supp. at 203; Ham, 189 P. at 468; Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at
43; Hacking, 736 A.2d at 1234; Trujillo, 986 P.2d at 758; Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38 at
228.
89. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 45-47; Hacking, 736 A.2d at 1232-35; Hillerby v. Town of
Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 458 (Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Trujillo, 986 P.2d at 758-59.
90. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 44-45 ("The separation of powers doctrine forecloses the
courts from reviewing political, social, and economic actions within the province of
coordinate branches of government."); Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 457 (Johnson, J. dissenting) ("To
preserve separate and coequal branches of government that best serve the public's interests,
government officials must feel that they can use free and independent judgment, without the
threat of liability hanging over them, regarding decisions involving the balancing of priorities
or the allocation of resources."); Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, 36, 262
Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 ("Governmental immunity was developed 'to protect public
officers from being unduly hampered or intimidated in the discretion of their functions by
threat of lawsuit or personal liability."') (quoting Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d
663, 682, 292 N.W.2d 816, 825 (1980)); KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033
("[Jiudicial review of executive action in tort suits or otherwise presents some degree of
threat to the independence of the executive and the separation of powers.").
91. Indus. Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 200, 204 (E.D. La.
1990); Kautzman, 621 N.W.2d at 879 (noting that "public policy considerations, social,
economic, or political, must be distinguished from more objective standards based on, for
example, scientific, engineering, or technical considerations").
92. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 44.
93. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 47 (noting that if a decision is not a policy decision but is
instead based on professional judgment, then "traditional tort standards for professional
negligence afford a basis for evaluation"); see also Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 257-58
(noting that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, where "the standards to be applied involve
objective and known criteria or require only the exercise of scientific or professional
judgments that are reviewable under tort law, the government is not shielded from liability").
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victim of the tortious conduct.94
Because government immunity is an exception to the basic tort
principle that liability should follow negligence,95 the doctrine should be
narrowly construed;9 immunity should only protect discretionary
government acts that truly involve policymaking and that are best
monitored through the political process. To determine whether
government immunity is appropriate in a given case, courts should
consider each of the following: (1) whether the particular act at issue is
discretionary in nature, (2) whether the act involves policy decisions,
and (3) whether the court system can provide an adequate framework
for monitoring or disciplining the act. Considering each of these three
factors will limit the application of government immunity to situations
where it is justified by public policy. As a result, it is more likely that
those who are injured by the tortious conduct of public officials will be
compensated. 97  At the same time, public officials will be held
accountable for their tortious conduct, which will help to deter future
government wrongdoing.98
94. See supra note 50.
95. Merrill v. Manchester, 332 A.2d 378, 380-81, 382-83 (N.H. 1974); Hillerby v. Town
of Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 453 (Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Krause, supra note 21, at
503; see also supra note 32.
96. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 46.
97. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 380 ("That an individual injured by the negligence of the
employees of a municipal corporation should bear his loss himself... instead of having it
borne by the public treasury to which he and all other citizens contribute, offends the basic
principles of equality of burdens and of elementary justice."); Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt.,
Inc. v. City of Winooski Hous. Auth., 408 A.2d 649, 650 (Vt. 1979) (noting that the effect of
government immunity is to "sacrifice the injured citizen to the benefit of the public
treasury"); see also supra note 51.
98. See discussion supra Part IV.B. and note 54.
2005]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [88:971
VI. GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY IN WISCONSIN
In Wisconsin, government immunity 99 refers to the immunity of the
state's political subdivisions for certain acts performed by public officials
within the scope of their official duties.'O° Government immunity derives
from the common law and is based on public policy considerations.1"'
Prior to the landmark decision in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee," a
broad-sweeping rule of government immunity existed in Wisconsin.1 3
The Holytz court, recognizing the injustice of such a broad rule of
government immunity, substantially limited the doctrine so that only the
exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial
functions"'-those acts involving judgment in determining policy or the
99. In Wisconsin, the concept of government immunity is sometimes referred to as
"governmental immunity" or "municipal immunity" or "public officer immunity" or
"discretionary act immunity." Hoskins v. Dodge County, 2002 WI App 40, 1 13, 251 Wis. 2d
276, 642 N.W.2d 213. Wisconsin's doctrine of government immunity is distinct from the
state's sovereign immunity. Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 89-90, n.7,
596 N.W.2d 417, 421-22, n.7 (1999). Wisconsin's sovereign immunity stems from the
Wisconsin constitution, which provides that "[t]he legislature shall direct by law in what
manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state." WIS. CONST., art. IV, §27.
This constitutional provision led to the rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent.
Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, 91 69, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 289 (citing Lister v. Bd. of
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 N.W.2d 610, 617 (1976)). Wisconsin's doctrine of
government immunity derives not from the Wisconsin constitution, but from common law,
Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, 22-23, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314, and is
now codified in section 893.80(4) of the Wisconsin statutes, which provides that
[n]o suit may be brought against any volunteer fire company organized under ch.
213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency thereof for the
intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be
brought against such corporation, subdivision or agency or volunteer fire company
or against its officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done in the exercise of
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
WtS. STAT. § 893.80(4) (2003). Although section 893.80(4) "does not apply to state officers
and employees," but rather "only to municipal officers and employees," the "concepts and
theories underlying immunity and its exceptions are generally the same for state and
municipal officers and employees." Meyers v. Schultz, 2004 WI App 234, n.5, 690 N.W.2d
873; see also Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, n.10, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663
N.W.2d 715.
100. Scott, 2003 WI 60, 1 14; Rolland v. County of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 53, 1 8, 241
Wis. 2d 215, 625 N.W.2d 590.
101. Lodl, 2002 WI 71, 11 22-23; Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 89-90, 596 N.W.2d at 421-22.
102. 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), superseded by statute as stated in Scott, 2003
WI 60, 1 34.
103. Riley, supra note 33, at 10.
104. Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 33-35, 39-40, 115 N.W.2d at 621-23, 625; see also Scott, 2003
WI 60, T 75-77 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
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application of a rule to specific facts-would be immune from liability.05
Essentially, the Holytz court made liability the rule and immunity the
exception."°"
Soon after the Holytz decision, the Wisconsin legislature adopted
Holytz's version of immunity.107 Today, this version of the doctrine of
government immunity is codified in section 893.80(4) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.'O' Under the statute,
[n]o suit may be brought against any.., political corporation,
governmental subdivision or any agency thereof for the
intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or employees nor
may any suit be brought against such corporation, subdivision or
agency or volunteer fire company or against its officers, officials,
agents or employees for acts done in the exercise of legislative,
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
Like the Holytz court, the Wisconsin legislature intended to make
the state's political subdivisions liable for tortious conduct, except for
those limited times when the public officials were exercising legislative,
judicial, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial functions, ° or in other words,
when the public officials were making policy decisions or applying a rule
to specific facts."'
Unfortunately, the doctrine of government immunity has been
extended far beyond protecting just those acts of a policymaking or
105. Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 259 N.W.2d 537, 541-42 (1977) ("A
quasi-legislative act involves the exercise of discretion or judgment in determining the policy
to be carried out or the rule to be followed. A quasi-judicial act involves the exercise of
discretion and judgment in the application of a rule to specific facts.")
106. Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
107. See WiS. STAT. § 893.80(4) (2003); see also Scott, 2003 WI 60, 34.
108. See Scott, 2003 WI 60, 34.
109. WIS. STAT. § 893.80(4) (2003). Section 893.80(4) "does not apply to state officers
and employees," but rather "only to municipal officers and employees." Meyers v. Schultz,
2004 WI App 234, n.5, 690 N.W.2d 873. However, in Wisconsin, the "concepts and theories
underlying immunity and its exceptions are generally the same for state and municipal
officers and employees." Id. at n.5; see also Scott, 2003 WI 60, n.10.
110. WIS. STAT. § 893.80(4) (2003); Scott, 2003 WI 60, 78-79 (Prosser, J., dissenting)
("[A] government agency seeking to rely on [section 893.80(4)] as a defense against the
negligence of its employee should be required to establish that the employee's negligence
occurred in the exercise of some legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial
function."); Riley, supra note 33, at 10.
111. Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503,511-12,259 N.W.2d 537, 541-42 (1977).
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judicial character."2 This is because in construing the statute, the
Wisconsin courts began to interpret the terms "quasi-legislative" and
"quasi-judicial" as synonymous with the term "discretionary."..3
Because almost every government act or decision involves some amount
of discretion," 4 government immunity has once again become the rule
and liability is now the exception."5 Such a broad doctrine of immunity
is contrary to legislative intent and produces unjust results."6
The fact that Wisconsin's government immunity doctrine is too
broad is evidenced by the judicial attempts to limit the application of
government immunity by creating exceptions to immunity. These
exceptions impose liability "where the activities performed are (1)
ministerial duties imposed by law, (2) duties to address a known danger,
(3) actions involving professional discretion, and (4) actions that are
malicious, willful, and intentional.' 1 7  While these judicially-created
exceptions limit the doctrine of government immunity, they have been
interpreted narrowly"' and have not limited the doctrine enough to
ensure that government immunity is only applied when policy warrants
its application.
When is the application of government immunity warranted by
policy? The Wisconsin courts have set forth the following policy
considerations to be considered in determining whether government
immunity should apply:
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the performance
of their functions by the threat of lawsuit; (2) The deterrent
effect which the threat of personal liability might have on those
who are considering entering public service; (3) The drain on
valuable time caused by such actions; (4) The unfairness of
subjecting officials to personal liability for the acts of their
subordinates; and (5) The feeling that the ballot and removal
procedures are more appropriate methods of dealing with
112. See, e.g., Scott, 2003 WI 60.
113. Id. 9116, 262 Wis. 2d at 139, 663 N.W.2d at 721; see also Riley, supra note 33, at 10.
114. Indus. Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Service, Inc., 735 F.Supp. 200, 203 (E.D.
La. 1990); Ham v. Los Angeles County, 189 P. 462, 468 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Peavler v.
Bd. of Comm'rs of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Ind. 1988); Hacking v. Town of
Belmont, 736 A.2d 1229, 1234 (N.H. 1999); Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 986 P.2d 752,
758 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38 at 228.
115. Scott, 2003 WI 60, 79 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
116. See id. 75-82 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
117. Id. T 16.
118. See id. 79 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
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misconduct in public office." 9
The first and fifth policy considerations, the desire to ensure that
public officials are able to use free and independent judgment in the
performance of their functions and the desire that the misconduct of
public officials be dealt with through the political process rather than
the court system, are valid reasons for applying government immunity
because they involve separation of powers concerns."" The threat of
liability for policy decisions in a tort suit might indeed interfere with the
free and independent judgment of public officials when making policy
decisions,121 and the ability of public officials to use free and
independent judgment is necessary to maintain separate and co-equal
branches of government.'22 In addition, it is true that the court system
may not be the best forum for analyzing policy decisions, which involve
social, political, and economic judgments. '23 Such judgments are best
made by public officials and should not be second-guessed by courts.
However, the second, third, and fourth policy factors cited by the
Wisconsin courts are inadequate to justify applying government
immunity. The second policy factor listed, concerning the deterrent
effect liability might have on those entering public service, does not
justify applying government immunity.12 1 Removing government
immunity would simply mean that public officials who are not acting in a
policymaking capacity would be placed on equal footing with private
parties.'26 Therefore, the threat of liability should no more deter
individuals from entering public service than the threat of liability would
deter individuals from working for a private entity.
119. Id. at n. 26.
120. See supra Part IV.
121. Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. 1988);
Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. 1990); Hillerby v. Town of
Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 457 (Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J. dissenting); Scott, 2003 WI 60, 36;
KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1033; Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 247;
Krause, supra note 21, at 502.
122. See Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 457.
123. See Indus. Indem. Co. v. Alaska, 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983); Peavler, 528
N.E.2d at 44-45, 47; Bowers v. City of Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tenn. 1992); Bagby
& Gittings, supra note 38, at 247.
124. See Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 44.
125. See supra Part IV.D.
126. City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Merrill v.
Manchester, 332 A.2d 378, 383 (N.H. 1974); Hillerby v. Town of Colchester, 706 A.2d 446,
458 (Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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The third policy factor listed, concerning the drain on valuable time,
also does not justify the application of government immunity. '27
Although removing government immunity may increase the amount of
litigation and the administrative burden, there is no evidence that the
orderly administration of government would be disrupted "in any
meaningful way."' 8  Moreover, any increased administrative burden
must be endured to ensure that those injured by the tortious conduct of
public officials are compensated. 129  The government can reduce the
amount of time spent on litigation by using due care in the performance
of its duties and avoiding the tortious conduct that serves as the basis for
such lawsuits.
The fourth policy factor, concerning the "unfairness of subjecting
public officials to personal liability for the acts of their subordinates,"'30
is also inadequate to justify government immunity."' Again, public
officials, when they are not involved in policymaking, should be liable to
the same extent private parties would be liable. 32 Because individuals in
private corporations are liable for the acts of their subordinates,
government should also be liable in this way. Applying government
immunity for this reason would only reduce the incentive to create a
more accountable government system.'33
In conclusion, many of the factors the Wisconsin courts currently
consider in determining whether to apply government immunity are
inadequate to justify the doctrine. Where the policy considerations
underlying the doctrine do not adequately justify applying government
127. See supra Part IV.C.
128. See Riley, supra note 33, at 14; see also supra note 58.
129. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 380; Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt., Inc. v. City of Winooski
Hous. Auth., 408 A.2d 649, 650 (Vt. 1979); see also supra note 50.
130. Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, n.26, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d
715.
131. See Riley, supra note 33, at 14 ("Public officials are not generally personally liable
for the acts of their subordinates, and insurance and indemnification would shield them from
any personal financial impacts."); see also supra Part IV (suggesting that, as a general rule,
government should be subject to the same rules as private parties for tortious conduct and
that only separation of powers concerns are adequate to justify government immunity).
132. Merrill, 332 A.2d at 380 (stating that "removal of immunity does not impose
absolute or strict liability on cities and towns but merely places them subject to the same rules
as private corporations if a duty has been violated and a tort committed"); Hillerby v. Town
of Colchester, 706 A.2d 446, 458 (Vt. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting that government
should be placed "on an equal footing with private corporate entities" for tortious conduct
unless the government action is "policy-based or... adjudicative, legislative, or regulatory in
nature").
133. See discussion supra Part IV & note 54.
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immunity, the doctrine has the potential to be applied in situations
where it is unnecessary, and a broad application of government
immunity can lead to unjust results.-4 To ensure that government
immunity is applied only in those limited circumstances where policy
justifies it, courts need to focus on the particular act at issue and
consider the following three factors: (1) whether the nature of the act is
discretionary, (2) whether the act involves policy decisions, and (3)
whether the court system is an appropriate place for monitoring or
disciplining the act. Determining the applicability of government
immunity on a case-by-case basis using these factors will ensure that
government immunity is applied only in situations where it is justified.'35
VII. SCOTT V. SAVERS PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
In Scott v. Savers Property & Casualty Insurance Co., a student
named Ryan Scott, along with his parents, met with Dave Johnson, the
guidance counselor at Ryan's school, to determine which courses Ryan
needed to take to be eligible for a hockey scholarship to the University
of Alaska, a National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA")
Division I school.'36 The Scotts specifically asked Johnson whether
"Broadcast Communication" was approved by the NCAA as fulfilling a
core English requirement.'37 Johnson misinformed the Scotts that
"Broadcast Communication" was approved by the NCAA even though
information that the course was not approved was available to
Johnson.38  Ryan relied on the information Johnson provided and
139
enrolled in the "Broadcast Communication" course.
After graduation, Ryan accepted a full four-year scholarship to the
University of Alaska.1" However, the scholarship offer was contingent
upon an eligibility certification from the NCAA,'' and, because
"Broadcast Communication" was not approved as fulfilling a core
134. See, e.g., Scott, 2003 WI 60, 1$ 75-82 (Prosser, J., dissenting). Government
immunity should be narrowly construed. Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Monroe County, 528
N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind. 1988).
135. See Hillerby, 706 A.2d at 459 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("Although it will not be easy
to set forth on a case-by-case basis a principled and cohesive doctrine that is both fair and
consistent, it will be far better than allowing to stand a doctrine acknowledged to be
inequitable and inconsistent.")








English requirement, the NCAA determined that Ryan was ineligible
for the scholarship.' 2 The University of Alaska subsequently rescinded
the scholarship.'
4 3
The guidance counselor's negligence was clear. 1" The real issue in
the case was whether the school district was immune from liability under
Wisconsin's government immunity statute.'45 The court began its
analysis by asking whether the guidance counselor's act could be
considered legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial. 146 This
inquiry was essentially a determination as to whether the act was
discretionary.1 7 Although the counselor was required by law to provide
guidance and counseling services to students,'48 the court concluded that
the counselor's act was discretionary. 14 9 According to the court, a
counselor's general duty to provide counseling does not mandate exactly
what advice or information a counselor should give to students. "' Thus,
the court determined that the school was immune and that Ryan would
be left without a remedy unless one of the judicially-created exceptions
to immunity applied."' The judicially-created exceptions imposing
liability occur "where the activities performed are (1) duties imposed by
law, (2) duties to address a known danger, (3) actions involving
professional discretion, and (4) actions that are malicious, willful, and
intentional."'52 In the Scott case, the court determined that the duties
were discretionary and not imposed by law"3 and that the professional
discretion exception to governmental immunity did not apply.' 4 The
parties did not claim that a known danger was present or that the
actions of the counselor were malicious, willful, or intentional. Because
the court found that none of the exceptions to immunity applied, the





146. See id. IT 15-16.
147. See id.
148. The District was obligated to provide guidance and counseling services. Wis. STAT.
§ 121.02(1)(e) (2003); Wis. ADMIN. CODE P.1. § 8.01(2)(e) (2003).
149. Scott, 2003 WI 60, 28.
150. Id.






Ryan had "no avenue for redress." '5
The justices recognized that the outcome of the Scott case was
"harsh," especially because the negligence was so clear.1 56 However, the
majority was concerned that removing the protection of immunity
would adversely impact Wisconsin students. As the court noted,
[g]uidance counselors are important figures in our educational
system. They are regularly required to make discretionary
decisions and judgment calls in performing their functions, and
the future progress and success of students rests on the ability of
the guidance counselors to make those decisions. Immunity
allows guidance counselors to perform their duties free from the
hindrance of threats of litigation or liability. "7
Although the desire to protect the discretionary decisions of
guidance counselors may have been well-intentioned, government
immunity simply should not be used to protect all decisions made by
guidance counselors or any other public officials.1 18 Rather, government
immunity should only be used to protect against liability when
government action involves decisions of a policymaking character159 or
decisions that should not be assessed in the courts."
To determine whether government immunity should apply,
Wisconsin courts should consider (1) the discretionary nature of the
particular act at issue, (2) whether the act involves policy decisions, and
(3) whether the political process or the court system is the appropriate
place for monitoring or disciplining such an act. Applying these three
factors to the Scott case illustrates why the result of the case was unjust
and why government immunity should not have been applied.
In Scott, the court applied government immunity because guidance
155. Id. 37-38.
156. Id. 9 37.
157. Id. 91 36.
158. See Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 44-47 (Ind. 1988);
Hacking v. Town of Belmont, 736 A.2d 1229, 1232-34 (N.H. 1999); Kautzman v. McDonald,
621 N.W.2d 871, 879-80 (N.D. 2001); Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 986 P.2d 752, 757-61
(Utah Ct. App. 1999); Bagby & Gittings, supra note 38, at 228.
159. Indus. Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Service, Inc., 735 F. Supp. at 202-03;
Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 46; Hacking, 736 A.2d at 1234; Haddock v. City of New York, 553
N.E.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. 1990); Trujillo, 986 P.2d at 758-59.
160. Indus. Indem. Co. v. Alaska, 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983); Peavler, 528 N.E.2d
at 44-45, 47; Bowers v. City of Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tenn. 1992); Bagby &
Gittings, supra note 38, at 247.
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counselors generally perform discretionary functions."' However, the
court should not have focused on the general duties of the guidance
counselor or his status as a guidance counselor; rather, the court should
have focused on the particular act at issue and whether that act was
discretionary in nature."' By focusing on the particular act at issue, the
court would have realized that the guidance counselor's action in
misinforming Ryan about the NCAA student-athlete scholarship
eligibility requirements was not discretionary in nature. The guidance
counselor had the necessary information available to him and needed
only to correctly relay that information to Ryan. His act did not involve
making a choice or a judgment; there were not two or more acceptable
results.163 Rather, he was to act in a way that was specifically directed by
the information he had available to him: he was to inform Ryan that
"Broadcast Communication" was not approved by the NCAA as
fulfilling a core English requirement. Thus, the nondiscretionary nature
of the act would have weighed against applying government immunity.' 4
Additionally, in determining whether the particular act at issue
deserves to be protected by government immunity, the court should
have looked beyond the discretionary nature of the act to ensure that a
social policy "of great importance, ' '161 such as the separation of powers,
justified shielding the act from liability and leaving the victim of the
tortious conduct without a remedy."6 Here, the guidance counselor's
actions did not implicate the separation of powers. The guidance
counselor did not make a policy decision or a judgment call that
involved weighing competing social, economic, or political factors, and
judicial review of the guidance counselor's action in this case would not
hamper the independent judgment of guidance counselors in factually
similar situations because no independent judgment is required in such
circumstances.
Finally, the court should have considered whether a tort suit would
have been an appropriate way to monitor the government action.
167
161. Scott, 2003 WI 60, J 36.
162. Rolland v. County of Milwaukee, 2001 Wl App 53, 1 8, 241 Wis. 2d 215, 625
N.W.2d 590 ("'[I]t is the nature of the specific act upon which liability is based, as opposed to
the categorization of the general duties of a public officer, which is determinative of whether
an officer is immune from liability."' (internal citation omitted)).
163. See supra Part V.
164. See supra Part V.
165. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 131, at 1032.
166. See supra Part V.
167. See supra Part V.
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Here, a tort suit would have been appropriate because there are
recognized, objective, professional standards that can be applied to the
challenged act to make tort liability a reliable assessment.68 The
guidance counselor had the information and only needed to correctly
relay it.1 69 Professional standards of due care and diligence would have
provided reliable standards for assessing the conduct.
Government immunity should not have shielded the guidance
counselor's negligent misrepresentation of information. Although the
court was trying to protect students, the result was likely detrimental to
students. By protecting the misrepresentations of the guidance
counselor, students will likely be less confident that guidance counselors
will be providing accurate information and may not be able to rely on
the information provided.
Wisconsin's government immunity doctrine has strayed so far off
course that public officials are not being held accountable for using care
in the performance of their duties. Allowing the guidance counselor's
lack of care to go unchecked was the real flaw of the Scott case.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Wisconsin's doctrine of government immunity can serve important
public policies. However, Wisconsin's government immunity doctrine is
in need of revision. Some of the current policy considerations cited as
underlying the doctrine are inadequate to support the application of
government immunity. In addition, the analysis used in determining
whether government immunity should apply needs to be reexamined.
Wisconsin courts need to focus on the particular act at issue and not on
the status or general duties of the government official. Courts also need
to ensure that government immunity protects conduct only when policy
warrants it by considering (1) the discretionary nature of the
government action, (2) whether the act involves policy decisions, and (3)
whether the court system is an appropriate place for monitoring or
disciplining the government action. Such an analysis will ensure that
government is only exempted from liability when it is justified and that
victims like Ryan Scott are fairly compensated for the negligence of
public officials.
LINDA M. ANNOYE
168. See supra Part V; see also supra note 93.
169. See Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, % 9, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663
N.W.2d 715.
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